January 16th, 2011
Rabbi Elchonon Wasserman (1874 – 1941) offers an ingenious answer:
In a situation where it is permitted to violate a prohibition in the Torah there are two ways how to view it.
One way is called hutra, which means that the prohibition does not exist. The other way to look at it is called hudcha, which means that the prohibition is here but the allowance to do the act overrides the prohibition.
An analogy of this might be the following: When a fire engine parks in front of a fire hydrant to put out a fire, why is the driver permitted to park there, is it because there is no prohibition for firemen to park in front of a fire hydrant when putting out a fire (hutra). Or is it that really a fire engine does not either have a right to park in front of a fire hydrant – it’s just that in this situation where he has to put out the fire, that cause overrides the prohibition of parking there (hudcha).
By the situation of the Kohen’s garment, there is no way to wear the garment without wearing shatnez (because the only way to make that garment is with shatnez). Therefore, it is logical to assume that the prohibition of wearing shatnez simply does not apply to the Kohen wearing it (this is called hutra). Once shatnez does not apply to that garment, he may wear it even while not performing the service.
Tzitzis on the other hand can be made with out shatnez. Since it can be made with out shatnez and yet it is still permissible to wear with shatnez – it is logical to assume that the prohibition is still here, yet the positive commandment overrides the negative commandment and therefore it is permitted to wear. Since the reason why it is permitted is because the prohibition is overridden (called hudcha), so where it would not be overridden, i.e. at night, it is prohibited to wear shatnez in tzitzis at night.
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January 16th, 2011
The Author of the book Shaagas Aryeh (1695 – 1785) asks the following question:
When a Kohen performs the service in the Temple (which should be rebuilt soon in our days) he wears special clothing. One of them is the “Avnate” the sash, which contains shatnez and the Torah instructs the Kohen to wear it among the other special clothing.
There is a disagreement between the Rambam (Maimonides) and the Ra’avid as to whether or not the Kohen may wear this garment containing shatnez even while he is not actually performing the service. The Rambam prohibits it and the Ra’avid permits it.
The question is that by tzitzis the Ra’vad said that one may not wear tzitzis at night if it contains shatnez, so why does the Ra’avid permit a kohen to wear shatnez while he’s not performing the service?
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January 16th, 2011
The Torah prohibits the wearing of a garment which contains shatnez. Shatnez is a garment which contains both wool and linen.
One is permitted to wear tzitzis even if it contains shatnez because a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment. Wearing tzitzis is a positive commandment (You shall make tzitzis) and the prohibition of wearing shatnez is a negative commandment (And shatnez you shall not wear).
The commentary known as the Ra’avid holds that the permissibility to wear tzizis containing Shatnez only applies to wearing them during the day. However, one may not wear tzitzis containing shatnez at night because at night there is no commandment to wear tzitzis. The Mitzvah to wear tzitzis is only during the day, so at night when there is no positive commandment to override the negative prohibition of wearing shatnez, one can not wear tzitzis.
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August 10th, 2010
Now that we have arrived at this point we can answer our original question. Does the rule allow one to wear a garment and strings where one is wool and the other is linen, so that the combination will be shatnez or can one even wear a garment that has shatnez in the garment itself?
Based on what we said that the rule applies because the person may wear the garment (based on the Mordecahi) and he will not be able to fulfill the positive commandment of putting on tzitzis strings – this can not apply to wearing a garment which contains shatnez in it. There is nothing that would permit a person to put on a garment which has shatnez in it. The Mordechai only said that the mitzvah of putting on tzitzis strings applies after you put on the garment, but that does not permit one to put on a garment which contains shatnez. Where the garment contains shatnez there is no conflict at all.
Therefore Rabbi Akiva Eiger says that the rule that one may wear tzitzis even if it is shatnez will only permit someone to wear a garment whose strings make it shatnez. However, one may not wear tzitzis if the garment itself contains shatnez.
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August 10th, 2010
Rabbi Eiger answers this question by quoting the opinion of the Mordechai (written by Mordechai bar Hillel Ashkenazi, an early commentator, whose commentary can be found in the back of the volumes of the Talmud). The Mordechai says an incredible thing. There is no prohibition to put on a four cornered garment which does not have tzitzis attached to it. It is only after you are wearing the garment do you now have a positive commandment to attach tzitzis to it. That is why if you are in a town where you can not acquire the strings to make tzitzis you may still wear the garment. If the prohibition was to put it on in the first place then you would not be able to put them on even if you live in a city where you can not acquire tzitzis. However, since the mitzvah begins after you put on the garment, and now you can not acquire tzitzis you are not required to remove the garment even though you are not able to fulfill the positive commandment of wearing tzitzis on a four corner garment.
Based on this Mordechai we can answer the question of why we should apply the rule that the positive commandment overrides the negative commandment in this situation – to permit one to wear shatnez by tzitzis. If we would not apply the rule here, then in this situation where the strings are linen and the garment is wool, one would be able to put on this four cornered garment and not be obligated to remove it even though there are no strings attached to it (as we saw in the Mordechai). The person will now be allowed to wear the garment and at the same time the person will be evading the fulfillment of the positive commandment of wearing tzitzis on a four cornered garment. By applying the rule that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment the person will now be able to put on the linen tzitzis to fulfill the positive commandment of wearing tzitzis – even though it is shatnez.
In the question stage before we knew the Mordecahi there was no reason to apply the rule because the person would not be wearing the garment in the first place since there are no tzitzis attached. No positive commandment would be evaded because he is not wearing the four cornered garment. Now that we have the Mordecahi who teaches us that the garment may be worn, we have to apply the rule to allow shatnez, for otherwise the person will avoid the fulfillment of the positive mitzvah of putting tzitzis on his four cornered garment which he is wearing.
Granted there is no conflict between the violation of a positive and negative commandment (because you do not have to put on the garment). Never-the-less we apply the rule so that there would not be a conflict between the fulfillment of the positive commandment and a negative commandment – since one may put on the four cornered garment even though the tzitzis would make it shatnez.
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August 8th, 2010
To answer this question Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks a different question: Why should the rule – which says that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment – apply to shatnez in tzitsis. This rule should only apply in a situation where there is a conflict between the two commandments. For example: The Torah commands a father to circumcise his son (he may use a moel as his agent) when the baby is 8 days old. If the baby was born on Shabbos, the bris is performed the following Shabbos on day 8 even though the bris procedure violates the Mitzvah to observe Shabbos. The reason why it is permitted is because we have a conflict; one has an obligation of the positive commandment to perform the bris on Shabbos, but there is a negative commandment – prohibiting one from inflicting a wound on Shbbos – which is preventing him from performing the bris, so he is stuck. The rule is that a positive commandment overrides the negative prohibition and he does perform the bris even on Shabbos.
In this situation of the bris on Shabbos there is a conflict. However, in the situation of shatnez in tzitzis there is no conflict because he does not have to wear that garment. The Mitzvah of tzizis is to put tzitzis strings on a four corner garment. There is no commandment to acquire a four corner garment to wear tzitzis. The commandment is to put on the tzitzis IF you want to wear the four cornered garment. In a situation wear it is shatnez there is no conflict; just do not put it on. If you do not put it on you will not be violating a positive commandment. So what right do we have to apply the rule which says that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment in this situation? One should not be permitted to wear tzitzis when he will be violating the prohibition of wearing shtnez? That rule is only applied when one is stuck and has a conflict?
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August 6th, 2010
Here is a new topic, a very interesting and a very deep one!
In the book of Deuteronomy chapter 22, the Torah writes two verses next to each other. Verse 11 states, “You shall not wear combined fibers, wool and linen together.” This verse teaches us about the prohibition of wearing a garment which contains both wool and linen. This combination is known as “shatnez”. A Jew may not wear a garment if both linen and wool are found in any part of the garment.
In the very next verse, verse 12, the Torah states, “You shall make for yourselves twisted threads on the four corners of your garment with which you cover yourself.” This verse teaches that if a man has a four corner garment he must attach tzitzis strings onto its four corners.
The Talmud in Tractate Yevamos teaches us that from the fact that the Torah juxtaposed these two verses adjacent to each other teaches us that the prohibition of wearing shatnez does not apply to tzitis. One is permitted to wear tzitzis even if they are shatnez.
From here the Talmud tells us that we can apply this concept to other Mitzvos as well – that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment. The positive commandment to put tzitis on a four corner garment overrides the negative commandment to not wear shatnez.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger wonders if this permissibility only allows one to put linen strings on a wool garment which now become shatnez or does this permissibility also allow one to wear a garment where the garment itself is shatnez.
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July 7th, 2010
However, concludes the Shmaytsa, the majority rule that applies to the half out side should in fact transfer to the half inside and indeed both halves are kosher. The Shmaytsa brings a brilliant proof from a passage in the Talmud in Tractate Kesubos.
A short introduction to that passage is the following: 1) If a woman has relations with a man who is not permitted to marry the general Jewish population (i.e. a mamzir, a person born from illicit relations) then that woman may not marry a Kohen (a Jewish priest). 2) A child who is born from such a union (where the mother had relations with a mamzir) may not marry into the Jewish population.
The Talmud in Kesubos (13a) discusses the following scenario: A woman who is not married is pregnant and we do not know who the father is. If he is a mamzir the mother would not be able to marry a Kohen and the child would not be able to marry someone from the Jewish population.
The law is that the mother may marry a Kohen because when ever we have a doubt about something we use chazaka, we assume the status quo. Before the question arose the woman was permitted to marry a Kohen, so until we know otherwise we assume that nothing has changed and therefore she can still marry a Kohen.
We also say that the chazaka for the mother (which says that the man was not a mamzir and allows her to marry a Kohen) will permit the child to marry a Jew. Since the mother is assumed to have had relations with someone not a mamzir the child can marry a Jew.
Says the Shmaytsa: The issue as to whether or not the child can marry a Jew is dependent on whether or not the man was a mamzir. The fact that chazaka tells us that the mother can marry a Kohen should not transfer to the child because the direct issue related to the child is the man not the mother. (It is true that logically one should follow the other, if the mother can marry a Kohen then obviously we are saying that the man was not a mamzir – however if you can not transfer chazaka then it should not transfer in this case either.) The chazaka was on the mother not on the child.
However since we see that it does transfer it must be that chazaka does transfer. Now if chazaka transfers then the concept of majority should certainly transfer – because the Talmud tells us that a majority is a stronger indication of events than chazaka is. Therefore, the majority rule on the half of the cow outside will transfer to the half inside and both halves are considered kosher.
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June 14th, 2010
The Shmaytsa explains the difference between the case of the majority and the case of chazaka as follows:
In the case of the Mikva: The uncertainty we have is not directly on the person who immersed in the Mikva (although it may relate to him), the uncertainty we have is how much water was in the Mikva. The direct issue is the amount of water in the Mikva. The uncertainty is on the Mikva, so we have to look at the Mikva. So if chazaka tells us that the Mikva contained an adequate amount of water we can now apply it to the person. (Chazaka tells us the answer to our direct question – which is the Mikva. Now that the Mikva is kosher, we can say that the person immersed in a kosher Mikva.)
In the case of the two halves of the cow: On the entire cow itself we have an uncertainty (whether this is the cow which had a hole in one of its organs). Therefore, if one half (outside) is kosher because of the rule of majority, we can not necessarily apply it to the other half (inside). It is true that it is not logical to have half kosher and half not kosher – but the issue as to whether one half is kosher is not what the other half is. The half inside has its own question.
Therefore, even though by the case of the Mikva we can transfer the chazaka to the person, yet by the cow the Pri Chadash holds we can not transfer the rule of majority from the half outside to the half inside.
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June 11th, 2010
The Shev Shmaytsa (Shmaytsa for short) discusses a new concept called “chazaka” which means status quo. When a doubt arises in certain situations and we do not know what to do the Torah tells us to follow the “chazaka”, assume the status quo. For example: In certain situations where a person is spiritually unclean the person must immerse in a kosher Mikva (a ritual bath). One of the requirements of a kosher Mikva is that it contains a minimum of 40 sa-ah (App. 200 gallons).
What happens in the following situation: We measure the Mikva and it is 40 sa’ah, then a person immerses in it and then ascends from it. Then for some reason we see later on that the water is below 40 sa’ah. We do not know when it went below the 40 sa’ah, perhaps it went below immediately before he entered. The rule is we follow chazaka which says that since before he went in we know it was above 40 sa’ah, and afterwards an uncertainty arose, we assume the status quo, which is that it was still 40 sa’ah when he went in; therefore he is considered to have immersed in a kosher Mikvah (and we assume that the change happened at the last possible moment).
The Shmaytsa asks on the above opinion of the Pri Chadash the following question: We see from the Pri Chadash that when it comes to the rule that one may assume that something came from the majority – as in the case of the half which was sold – we do not transfer that to the half inside. Even though logically you can not technically have half an animal kosher and half not kosher, yet in this situation the rule of majority is limited to the half outside – we do not use the logic to transfer the kosher status to the half inside.
Yet when it comes to chazaka we will transfer the chazaka of the mikva to the person. In this case a person was unclean before he immersed, then an issue came up regarding the kashrut of the Mikva – and we applied chazaka to the Mikva which is now transferred to the person by making him considered purified. Why by the rule of majority does the Pri Chadash say that we can not transfer the majority from the outside half to the inside half?
What’s the diff??
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